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The paper is an  update through early  1994 of a similarly titled paper (Bank of 
Finland Discussion Papers 8/93). It gives a brief description of the evolution of 
the Finnish banking crisis and its handling. In the fIrst section, the salient features 
of the  Finnish  banking  system  are  described.  We  then  briefly  discuss  the 
liberalization process, macroeconomic and regulatory policies, and the subsequent 
credit boom and its development into a recession of unprecedented depth.  Next, 
we  document  the  impact  on  bank profitablity  of the  drastic  changes  in  mac-
roeconomic conditions. The collapse and rescue of Skopbank are summarized. 
In section  2 we  describe the  public  safety  net,  starting  with the  pre-crisis 
arrangements. This is followed by an exposition in section 3 of the new measures 
taken in 1992 and 1993, with the emphasis on the establishment of the Govern-
ment Guarantee Fund, its organization, powers and principles of operation. 
Section 4 gives an account of the support measures taken by the Goverment 
Guarantee Fund in the course of 1992 and the whole of 1993. 
Finally, in section 5,  we  discuss  the banks'  current economic environment 
and their prospects in the near future, now also brought forward into early 1994. 
The paper includes references to recent articles and discussion papers dealing 
with important aspects of the current banking crisis. The list of references is by no 
means  exhaustive,  and  it  is  designed  mainly  to  help  foreign  readers  to  fmd 
supplementary material. Therefore only those papers in Finnish or Swedish which 
have to do most with the current crisis are included. 
Tiivistelma 
The Finnish Banking Crisis and Its Handling xl94 on uusittu laitos aikaisemmasta 
samannimisesta keskustelualoitteesta (Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 8/93). 
Uusittu laitos kattaa tilanteen vuoden 1994 alkuun saakka ja siihen sisaItyy lyhyt 
kuvaus Suomen pankkikriisin kehityksesta ja sen hoidosta. 
Ensimmaisen  luvun  alussa  kuvataan  Suomen  pankkijarjestelma 
paapiirteissaan.  Sen  jaIkeen  kasitellaan  lyhyesti  saannostelyn  purkamista, 
makrotaloudellista ja saannostelypolitiikkaa, luottoekspansiota ja sen kaantymista 
ennennakemattoman  syvaksi  taantumaksi.  Luvun  lopussa esitetaan,  miten rajut 
muutokset taloudellisissa oloissa ovat vaikuttaneet pankkien kannattavuuteen, ja 
kaydaan lyhyesti lapi Skopin kriisi ja pelastusoperaatio. 
Luvussa 2 kuvaillaan julkista turvajarjestelmaa kriisia edeltavista jlirjestelyista 
lahtien.  Luvussa  3  kasitellaan  vuosien  1992  ja 1993  toimenpiteita,  erityisesti 
Valtion  vakuusrahaston  perustamista,  sen  organisaatiota,  valtuuksia  ja 
toimintaperiaatteita.  Luvussa  4  selvitetaan  Valtion  vakuusrahaston  tukitoimia 
vuosina 1992 ja 1993. Luvussa 5 kasitellaan pankkien tamanhetkista taloudellista 
toimintaymparistOa ja tulevaisuuden nakymia, myos alkuvuoden 1994 osalta. 
Lopun  kirjallisuusluettelo  sisaItaa  viimeisimpia  pankkikriisia  kasittelevia 
artikkeleita ja keskustelualoitteita.  Luettelo  ei  pyri  olemaan  taydellinen;  se  on 
tarkoitettu lahinna ulkomaalaisille lukijoille avuksi lisamateriaalin lOytamiseksi. 
Sen  vuoksi  mukaan  on  otettu  vain  ne  suomalaiset ja ruotsalaiset  artikkelit ja 
keskustelualoitteet, jotka ovat tarkeimpia tamanhetkisen kriisin kannalta. 
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6 1  Banks and the Finnish Economy 
1.1  Bank intermediation dominates 
Deposit banks  are central to  the Finnish financial  system. The bulk of financial 
intermediation takes place through deposit banks. Thus, some 50 per cent of the 
finanCing needed by the public (the corporate and  household sectors) is  provided 
directly by deposit banks (Chart 1). In addition, banks have guaranteed about half 
of the  lending  by  insurance companies.  Also,  with one exception,  all  mortgage 
institutions  and  the  largest  finance  companies  are subsidiaries of deposit  bank 
groups. In all,  about two-thirds of the credit risks  associated with the borrowing 
by the public is  carried by  the banks. The role of the banks  is  especially I?redo-
minant in  the case of households and small and medium-sized businesses. 
. Chart 1.  Composition of the liabilities of the public, 
31  Dec.  1991 * 
1 BankS 49.7 %. 
2 Insurance institutions 17.5 %. 
3  Other financial  institutions 8.6 %. 
4  Public 10.7 %. 
5 Foreign sector 10.6 %. 
6 Public sector 2.9 %. 
* Statistics Finland: Financial Market Statistics 1992:24. 
In  the  second  half of the  1980s,  securities  markets  developed  rapidly  and  the 
abolition  of exchange controls  allowed  the  private  sector  to  borrow  from  and 
invest abroad freely. This improved the availability of finance from sources other 
than  the  banks.  Particularly foreign  borrowing was widely  used,  starting in  the 
mid-1980s,  although  more  than  half of this  financing was  intermediated  by  the 
7 banks. The increase in the  share of non-bank finance  may partly reflect excep-
tionally favourable macroeconomic conditions, and might not have obtained quite 
such a high level in more normal times despite increased competitive pressures. 
The role of the banks in Finland is important not only as a source of finance 
but also as regards the control of companies. The Finnish banks are of the uni-
versal type and are thus engaged in various investment bank activities and have 
significant stakes in non-financial companies. Therefore, banks are able (and quite 
often willing) to exercise strong influence over financial and strategic decisions in 
many enterprises. 
The  banking  system  comprises  five  major  bank groups  and  a  number of 
smaller  commercial  banks,  some  of  which  are  fully-owned  subsidiaries  or 
branches of  foreign banks. Formally, there are a large number of  individual banks, 
as  the  co-operative  banking  group  consists  of 304  individual  banks  and  the 
savings bank group of 39  savings banks (end-1993  figures).  However, in many 
important respects, the co-operative banks operate as one entity, as do the savings 
banks.  Despite some specialization, all major banking groups are active in most 
geographical and business areas.l 
1.2  Excess banking capacity 
The banks'  service  network in  Finland is  large  and  technically  very  efficient. 
However, because of its size, it is also costly. 
Up to the mid-1980s, direct price competition was all but impossible due to 
regulation. Competition took the indirect form of attracting low-cost deposits by 
building large branch networks and investing heavily in automated payment and 
other banking technologies. The result was that Finland now not only has more 
banking personnel and branches per capita than the neighbouring Nordic countries, 
but also  one  of the  densest  and  most  advanced  networks  of automated  teller 
machines and point-of-sale terminals in the world (Table 1). 
The extensive resource use is reflected in operating costs, which are high by 
international standards. However, banks'  total income is not exceptionally high 
(Table 2).1 Therefore, the high operating costs result in weak underlying profita-
bility and constitute evidence of substantial excess capacity in the industry. 
In recent years, banks' use of resources has started to decline. The number of 
employees had been cut by some 30 per cent by the end of 1993 from its peak in 
1989  (Chart  2).  A  similar  change  has  occurred  in  the  number  of branches. 
However, labour costs have not come down correspondingly. 
1  For a fairly  recent general  description  of the  Finnish financial  system,  see Bank of Finland 
(1991).  A detailed account of the banking system is  given by  the Finnish Bankers'  Association 
(1991). 
2  International  comparisons  are  obviously  problematic,  as  institutional  set-ups  and  economic 
environments  vary  a great deal  between countries.  For example,  in  bank-dominated economies 
(Germany, Japan, Finland) banks' balance sheets are bolstered by low-income, low-risk interme-
diation, which in other countries may be taken care of by special housing finance institutions or by 
securities markets. Given the many similarities of the Nordic countries, comparisons between them 
are likely to  be the most useful ones. 
8 Table 1.  Banking capacity in the Nordic countries 
Per 10 000 inhabitants 
End of 1991 
Branches  Staff  ATM  EFTPOS 
Finland  6.2  (8.2)1  93.6  (l04.4f  5.8  67.0 
Sverige  3.7  (5.9)1  55.0  (83.1)3  2.5  9.7 
Norway  3.9  59.2  4.1  37.4 
Denmark  5.0  99.5  2.1  37.8 
1 Incl. post offices. 
2 Incl. post office personnel in customer service (5 420). 
3 Incl. post office personnel in customer service (18415), personnel of the postal giro  system 
(3  840) and personnel in the housing finance institutions. 
Table 2.  Bank profitability in selected countries 
Per cent of balance sheet total, average 1985-1990* 
Country  Net interest  Non-interest  Total income  Operating  Net income 
income  income  expenses  before 
provisions 
Finland  1.98  1.98  3.97  3.19  0.78 
Denmark  2.74  1.14  3.89  2.24  1.65 
Norway  3.24  1.05  4.28  2.96  1.32 
Sweden  2.29  1.01  3.30  1.97  1.33 
USA  3.44  1.49  4.92  3.29  1.64 
Japan  1.13  0.34  1.47  0.92  0.55 
Germany  2.19  0.62  2.81  1.80  1.00 
France  2.38  0.48  2.81  1.88  0.93 
U.K.  3.17  1.92  5.09  3.33  1.75 
* The widest available aggregate for each country 




1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
o  Saving banks! 
I  Co-operative banks  I  Commercial banks (incl. Postipankki) 
! SBF included in the savings banks. 
1.3  Bad banking and bad policies in the 1980s 
1.3.1  Financialliberalization 
Deregulation of the fmancial markets started in the early 1980s (Chart 3). Already 
in  1980,  the  links  to  foreign  short-term markets  were  greatly  strengthened by 
allowing  the  banks  to  borrow  freely  in  foreign  money  markets  to  cover  the 
forward  currency  exposure  they  could  equally  freely  supply  to  commercial 
, customers. The first foreign banks were established (as subsidiaries) in the Finnish 
market in 1983, resulting in more intensive competition in the market for foreign 
exchange and in the emerging money market. 
Interest rate deregulation got under way in 1983 with measures on the lending 
rate side. This gradual process was completed in 1986, when banks were allowed 
to  determine  freely  the  level  of interest  rates  on  new  loans.  Major  steps  to 
liberalize capital movements were taken in 1986 and 1987 by allowing long-term 
borrowing  without  restriction  for  selected  sectors  and  for  all  nonfmancial 
companies. 
A true money market was established by exempting bank CDs from the cash 
reserve requirement and  agreeing on a code of conduct to be applied in money 
market operations  (to  ensure that the  market operated in all circumstances, the 
Bank of Finland issued its own CDs as needed). Furthermore, the Bank of Finland 
discontinued its practice of periodically issuing guidelines on credit policy to the 
banks. Borrowing and lending decisions were thus left to the market participants 
10 alone  for  the  first  time  in  decades.  Although  the  process  of  liberalization 
continued until 1991, the most important decisions were taken in 1986 and 1987.3 















RELAXATION OF LENDING RATE REGULATION: PASS-THROUGH FORMULA 
!I1980  11 
EQUAL ENTRY FOR FOREIGN BANKS TO THE CALL MONEY MARKET 
I 
CALL MONEY DEPOSIT RATE SEPARATED FROM THE CREDIT RATE 
ABOUTION OF REGULATION OF LENDING RATES 
FLOATING RATES ALLOWED ON SOME LOANS 
CD'S EXEMPT FROM RESERVE REQU!REMENT 
OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS INTRODUCED 
HEUBOR RATES INTRODUCED 
CREDIT GUIDEUNES DISCONTINUED 
FLOATING RATES AULOWED ON AUL LOANS 
PRIME RATES ALLOWED AS REFERENCE RATES 
1 
1988  11  1989  1  1990  11  1991  11  1992  li 
J 
FJEE FOREX BORROWING 
FOR HOUSEHOLDS 
FREE SHORT-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
FREE HOUSEHOLD FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
I
t  FOR EX REGULATIONS RELAXED EXCEPT FOR HOUSEHOLDS 
AND SHORT-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
i  i  FREE DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD FOR NONFINANCIAL COMPANIES 
I  FREE LbNG-TERM FOREIGN BORROWING FOR OTHER COMPANIES 
I  FREE LbNG-TERM FOREIGN BORROWING FOR MANUFACTURING AND SHIPPING COMPANIES 
LIMITED CURRENCY OPTIONS AULOWED TO AUTHORIZED BANKS 
BANKS FREE TO COVER COMMERCIAL FORWARD POSITIONS 
1.3.2  Unconstrained stock adjustment starts 
The liberalization of the domestic credit market and foreign exchange transactions 
was not accompanied by  other reforms that would  have significantly dampened 
the  expansionary  effects  of liberalization.  The  incentives  to  borrow  remained 
unchanged,  economic  policy  in  general  did  not  adequately  restrain  domestic 
demand  or  price  and  income  expectations,  and  banking  supervision  was  not 
tightened. 
Tax  incentives  to  borrow  were  not  changed  significantly  as  liberalization 
proceeded. Because equity  capital  remained  heavily  taxed  relative  to  debt,  the 
latter  continued  to  be  the  cheapest  form  of  external  finance  to  companies. 
Furthermore,  households'  interest  expenses  could  be  deducted  from  taxable 
income  at  a  high  marginal  tax  rate,  making  borrowing  very  attractive  to 
households.  Finally,  tax  exemption  of interest  earnings  on  low-yielding  bank 
deposits constituted a subsidy to  banks, boosting their capacity to  lend. 
3  The liberalization process up  to  1988 has  been  described  and  analyzed  by  Abrams (1989).  A 
history of exchange controls is  provided by  Lehto-Sinisalo  (1992). The  lifting of regulations on 
foreign eXChange  is  also discussed by  Nyberg (1992a), 
11 Previously,  credit  rationing  had  prevented  the  attainment  of the  preferred 
portfolio compositions implied by  these borrowing incentives. With the lifting of 
the  regulations  such  hindrances  suddenly  no  longer existed.  UnderstaIfdably,  a 
large-scale stock adjustment followed. Households as well as businesses started to 
borrow as never before. In the peak year of 1988, for instance, bank lending grew 










Bank lending to the corporate and household sectors 
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Per cent change over 4 quarters 
_  Total lending  I  Share of foreign currency loans at  1990 exchange rates 
m Share of markka loans 
In  retrospect,  it  is  clear  that  neither  banks  nor  customers  took  adequate 
account of the  changing  financial  environment.  Banks,  unused  to  recognizing, 
evaluating and  controlling  risks  inherent  in  unregulated  markets,  continued  to 
operate on the basis of partly outdated principles. Competition for market shares 
was the dominant objective and led  to a lowering in banks' credit standards. Insuf-
ficient attention was given to the value and  quality of collateral, trust being put in 
the historical  unlikelihood  of falling  asset values.  Credit  risk  was not correctly 
priced.s Likewise,  interest rate risks  attracted  too  little  attention.  By the  same 
token, borrowers appear to  have misjudged the risks associated with floating rate 
and foreign currency loans,  being used  to  administered prices.6 
4  For example,  Brunila  and  Takala (1993) document  the  increase  in  the  indebtedness of the 
private sector. 
5 Murto (1993) analyzes the pricing of credit risk in  the savings bank sector using micro data. 
6  The  exchange-rate  risks  associated  with  foreign  currency  loans  are,  of course,  borne  by  the 
borrowers. Banks' total currency exposures have throughout been strictly regulated by tpe Bank of 
Finland.  But  to  the  extent that changes  in  exchange  rates  lead  to  credit  losses,  the  banks  also 
effectively carry part of the exchange-rate risk. 
12 At  the  same  time,  regulators  did  not  for  several  reasons  strengthen 
supervisory efforts. As in many other countries, deregulation was accompanied by 
strong public and political pressures stressing the blessings of unregulated, private 
choice.  Banking  regulation  focused  on  judicial  compliance  rather  than  risk 
evaluation. Furthermore, decisions by the supervisory authorities could be - and 
were - challenged in court, which probably raised the threshhold for introducing 
stricter supervisory practices. 
Macroeconomic policies were not geared to restraining the positive demand 
impulses  stemming  from  financial  liberalization.  In part this  was  because  the 
significance of the impulses was not fully understood. In part the cyclical situation 
was misjudged,  and, finally,  policies were constrained by objectives other than 
short-term demand management.  Although  government finances  indicate  some 
fiscal restraint in 1988 as well as in 1989, no major tightening took place. Rather, 
the longer-tenn objective of reducing direct taxation was given priority. 
The BaDk of Finland, for its part, did not take timely action to restrain credit 
expansion through monetary means,  apart from some  rather  strong  statements. 
Partly this was undoubtedly because the strength of the expansion was not fore-
seen. However, the lack of sufficient action was partly due to the overriding target 
of a fixed exchange rate, which made it difficult to raise money market rates. The 
implications of this constraint, on the other hand, were not fully understood more 
widely in the economy. 
1.3.3  Positive shocks give a further boost 
Simultaneously with the new freedoms in the credit market, national income was 
boosted by a significant improvement in the terms  of trade between  1986  and 
1989; oil prices declined in 1986 while export prices kept on rising (Chart 5). The 
world-wide relaxation of macroeconomic policies in the wake of the stock market 
crash of 1987  accelerated the growth of export markets. When these favourable 
shocks hit,  the economy already had behind it half a decade  of comparatively 
rapid and stable growth (Chart 6). In Finland, confidence was further boosted by 
the relative ease with which the oil shocks in the early 1980s had been overcome 
with the help of bilateral trade with the  Soviet Union.  The result was  a highly 
optimistic atmosphere where reasonable constraints on growth and welfare appear 
to have been temporarily forgotten. 
13 Chart 5. 
Chart 6. 
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1994 Demand not only for consumer goods but also for all real and financial assets 
increased substantially. Stock prices and real estate values soared. High asset va-
lues  in  turn  boosted  wealth  and  kept  debt-asset ratios  deceptively low.  In  part, 
new investments expanded the productive capacity of export industries. However, 
far more money was spent on investment in  the closed sectors of the economy: 
retail trade, recreation and  housing (Chart ~). 
Chart 7.  Investment by sectors, per cent of GDP 
%  % 
1or--------r------~r-------~--------~~10 
0~~~~-L~~~~~~~-4~~~~~~~0 
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990 
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----------- Man  ufact  uri ng 
1.3.4  Policy response: late and little 
The record-high rates of credit expansion and other relevant data led  the authori-
ties to tighten monetary policy in early 1989. The markka was permitted to appre-
ciate by adjusting the fluctuation range for the currency index. At the same time, 
expansion  of  bank  lending  was  penalized  by  a  special  reserve  requirement 
imposed on the banks by the Bank of Finland. Short-term market rates increased 
substantially towards the end of the year. 
The markka lending of most  banks started  to  decelerate rapidly.  However, 
some banks  in  the savings bank sector chose to  pay  the  new penal  rates  rather 
than curtail their rapid credit expansion. Furthermore, as markets were now free, 
borrowing  in  foreign  currencies  continued  to  increase  at  a  high  rate  (partly 
through bank  intermediation).7  Higher markka rates  made such borrowing  look 
cheap on the assumption of broadly unchanged exchange rates.  Giv~n the widely-
publicized policy of a fixed exchange rate pursued by the Bank of Finland and the 
successful defence of the markka in 1986, such expectations were understandable 
despite the recent revaluation. 
7  The special  reserve  requirement penalized commercial lending less  than lending to  the  house-
holds. As, at the time, borrowing by households in foreign currency was still restricted while enter-
prises could borrow freely, foreign currency lending slowed less than markka lending. 
15 The monetary  tightening  of the  early  1989 was  too  late  and  too  small  to 
significantly affect overall demand conditions that year. Neither was there a clear 
shift in fiscal policy towards curbing domestic demand. Indirect taxes were raised 
and the growth of government spending reduced but household taxes were at the 
same time cut in  line with the long-term tax-policy goals of the Government. As 
a result, 1989 was the second consecutive year with real GDP growth of (slightly 
more than) 5 per cent; housing production alone rose by  20 per cent. 
As the unemployment rate was below 4 per cent, the economy was clearly in 
a state of overheating. This showed up  in  an acceleration of labour costs, further 
eroding external  competitiveness,  which  had  already  been  weakening for some 
time (Chart 8). 
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1.4  From boom to bust 












Towards the end of 1989,  the  tighter monetary co'nditions  and  high  debt  levels 
started to  undermine domestic demand. Servicing the newly-raised debts took an 
increasing share of the cash flow of many enterprises and  households (Chart 9). ' 
Particularly demand for real estate was quickly affected. Asset values and  profits 
started  to  decline sharply  (Chart 10).  Unemployment bottomed out and  income 
prospects weakened.  At the same time, export performance deteriorated as market 
growth decelerated  and  market shares  were lost  in  response to  weakened  price 
competitiveness. In 1990, the growth of the  economy slowed  to  zero,  reflecting 
both capacity constraints and  weakening demand. 
16 Chart 9.  Debt service burden 
(a)  Households 
Interest payments and estimated amortizations, per cent of household 
disposable income, 1979-1993 * 
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* Source: Anne Brunila (1993). 
17 Chart 10.  Asset values 
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1.4.2  Output hit by bad luck 
Following a gradual decline over several years, exports to the Soviet Union finally 
collapsed in  1991.  Given  the  different  commodity  composition  of exports  to 
eastern and western markets and the weak price competitiveness of Finnish manu-
factures,  only  a  very  small  proportion  of  the  lost  exports  could  be  directly 
replaced by sales to  other markets. The increasingly severe payments problem of 
that country also implied that at least part of Finnish credits to  Russian importers 
could not be recovered on time. 
The loss of Soviet export markets brought about a negative demand shock of 
the order of 2.5 per cent of GDP, including indirect effects. The resulting decline 
in  incomes  further  increased  the  problems  of those  with  relatively  high  debt-
$ervice obligations. As the adjustment of domestic demand to  increased indebted-
ness continued with full force, total demand declined by 6.5  per cent in 1991. The 
unemployment rate reached 11  per cent by  the end of the year. 
1.4.3  Financial risks materialize 
The rapid  decline  in  output was  accompanied  by  serious  balance of payments 
problems (Chart 11). This weakened confidence in the Finnish economy in general 
and  in  the fixed  exchange rate in  particular. Expectations of a devaluation of the 
markka started to gain strength. In  an  attempt to  bolster confidence in the existing 
exchange rate,  the  markka  was  linked  to  the  ecu  in  June  1991.  That  allowed 
nominal money market rates to decline for a short while, but real  rates of interest 
generally moved higher in  1991. Strong expectations of an  imminent devaluation 
18 pushed  nominal  short-term  rates  substantially  higher  in  the  autumn,.' and  in 
November the markka was devalued by  12.3 per cent (Chart 12). 
Both the high and continually rising interest rates and  the devaluation reduced 
the public's capacity to service its debt. By mid-1991 the number of bankruptcies 
had  increased to  a monthly average of some 600 from  around  200 a year before 
(Chart  13).  While  the  effect  of higher  rates  worked  through  gradually,  the 
depreciation of the markka abruptly raised the debt-service burden for firms in the 
domestic sector, with substantial borrowing in foreign currency. 
Combined with  plummeting profits  and  declining household  incomes  these 
developments  transformed  a  steadily increasing share of banks'  loan  portfolios 
into non-performing assets. Some 1.5 per cent of banks outstanding loans (about 
1 per cent of the balance sheet total) had  to  be booked as  credit losses  in  1991. 
Given  the weak underlying profitability,  banks'  aggregate profit before extraor-
dinary items became negative  . 
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1994 1.5  The ftrst bank failure:  Skopbank 
1.5.1  Risky strategy backfrres 
The fIrst bank to get into serious difficulties was Skopbank, the commercial bank 
that acts as a central bank for the savings banks. Skopbank had pursued an aggres-
sive lending policy in the boom years. It had also acquired a majority holding in 
Tampella Oy, a multiproduct industrial group, presumably with the aim of making 
it the industrial flagship of the savings bank group. Being fInancially weak after 
large-scale  investments,  however,  Tampella  encountered  severe  profItability 
problems, as soon as the general economic climate took a turn for the worse. 
Skopbank had been under the special and increasingly strict surveillance of 
the Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision OffIce since autumn  1989. In 
October  1990,  the  authorities  drew  up  a  restructuring  programme  aimed  at 
managing the bank's large risk exposures and strengthening its capital base. The 
savings banks were required to provide FIM 1.8 billion in fresh capital for their 
central bank as a part of this rescue programme. 
1.5.2  Liquidity crisis prompts action 
By the end of summer 1991, it became increasingly evident that Skopbank could 
not meet the  goals  of the  restructuring programme.  The  authorities  drew  up  a 
contingency plan as confIdence in Skopbank collapsed on 19 September and the 
bank  was  faced  with  an  acute  shortage  of liquidity.  As  there  was  no  other 
authority  equipped  to  deal  with this  type  of operation,  it was  decided that the 
Bank of Finland must step in. The Bank of Finland then took control of Skopbank 
with immediate effect in order to retain confIdence in the Finnish banking system. 
The restructuring of  Skopbank got under way immediately by setting up three 
companies to manage substantial portions of the assets of the bank. Scopulus Oy 
was  created  to  own  shares  in  Skopbank,  Solidium  Oy  to  take  over  most  of 
Skopbank's industrial holdings (including Tampella) and Sponda Oy to administer 
Skopbank's share and some of its real estate holdings. Strict targets were set for 
reductions in the remaining part of Skopbank's balance sheet and in costs.  The 
board of the bank was largely replaced. 
The Bank of Finland has used a net total of almost FIM 14 billion to fInance 
the operation. Of that almost FIM 4 billion was originally used for recapitalizing 
Skopbank,  of which  more  than  2.5  billion  have  been  recovered.  Lost  interest 
earnings amounted to about FIM 1.5 billion by the end of 1993 (not included in 
table 4 below)  . Some FIM  11  billion remain outstanding to the holding com-
panies, part of which may be lost in the future. The ownership of Skopbank was 
transferred to the newly-created Government Guarantee Fund in June 1992 (see 
section 3 below).8 
8 Decisions on selling subtantial parts of the Tampella group have already been taken. In the early 
summer of 1992,  stakes in the metal  and engineering division  were sold to foreign  buyers.  In 
March 1993, the paper division was sold to a Finnish competitor. Later Solidium has sold a large 
part of Tampella stock to private investors. At the moment, Solidium owns some 22 per cent of 
Tampella. 
21 1.6  Banks' losses soar 
1.6.1  The economy continues to contract 
The rapid decline  in output that had  begun during  1989  continued all  through 
1991 and 1992. Although exports had already started to recover in 1991 and grew 
by about 9 per cent in 1992, this was not enough to offset weak domestic demand. 
Real  GDP  still  fell  by  3.5  per  cent  in  1992  despite  increasing  industrial 
production. Business failures, primarily in the domestic sector, continued at a high 
rate, reaching a high of 800 failures a month in the autumn. 
At  the  same  time,  nominal  interest  rates  continued  to  rise.  This  partly 
reflected the higher level of European interest rates. More  significant, however, 
was speculation fuelled by expectations of a further devaluation of the markka, 
which kept interest rate differentials wide.  By early September, the  speculative 
pressure,  strengthened  by  the  general  turbulence  in  the  European  currency 
markets, had become so intense that the Bank of Finland had to let the  markka 
float.  The markka depreciated initially by some  10 per cent. By early  1993, the 
cumulative depreciation since September had reached 20 per cent (the exchange 
rate  index  had  risen  by  26  per  cent),  but  in  April  the  markka  appreciated 
markedly. Despite some initial fears, exchange rate developments appear to have 
influenced bankruptcies only marginally. 
As  a result of subdued demand, inflation remained modest and asset prices 
kept falling in 1992, despite the substantial currency depreciation. Consequently, 
real rates of interest continued to rise and collateral values to fal1.9 
1.6.2  Problem assets and losses mount 
Not surprisingly, the stock of banks' non-performing assets grew rapidly during 
1992 from FIM 42 billion at  the beginning of the year to  no  less than FIM 77 
billion by the end of the year.lO  Of this amount,  some FIM 22 billion (4.8  per 
cent of total lending) was booked as credit losses. 
Reflecting the structure of lending during the boom, some 40 per cent of the 
non-performing  assets  were  related to construction, real  estate and  retail trade. 
Households accounted for 21  per cent of the total and foreign engagements for 14 
9 For a discussion of the deflation process in Finland, see Honkapohja, Koskela and Paunio (1993). 
Three general analyses of the Finnish economic crisis and the role of economic policies are given 
by Bordes, Currie, and SOderstrom (1993). 
10 A loan is recorded as non-performing when the payment of interest or repayment of principal is 
in arrears by more than three months. Similarily, a bank guarantee is included in the stock of non-
performing assets, if  the underlying liability arises. Systematic collection of  data on non-performing 
loans did not start until towards the end of 1991. Little is thus known about the development of 
problem assets in the early phases of the crisis. 
22 per cent.  Manufacturing accounted for  less  than  8  per cent of problem assets, 
reflecting the increased competitiveness and activity of that sector.II 
Worst hit was again the savings bank group, which accounted for about half 
of the  aggregate  loss.  As  noted  earlier,  the  savings  banks  had  aggressively 
expanded their market share  of lending during  the  boom years.  This  naturally 
made for weaker-than-average loan quality, in certain instances strikingly so.  In 
addition, a significant part of the savings bank group's lending to  the domestic 
sectors was denominated in foreign currencies, thus making the clients vulnerable 
to the depreciation of the markka. 
The  non-performing  loans  were  largely  responsible  for  the  weakening  of 
banks' net interest income. It was, however, also squeezed by shifts  of deposits 
from low-cost, tax-exempt accounts into higher-yielding taxable accounts induced 
inter alia by the introduction of a low withholding tax on most interest earnings. 
Given the relatively low level of the Bank of Finland's base rate, to which almost 
half  of all  outstanding  markka  loans  were  linked,  such  shifts  could  not  be 
compensated for by corresponding increases in lending rates. Consequently, banks' 
losses before extraordinary items increased by FIM  17  billion to  FIM 22 billion 
in 1992, which became the peak year of bank losses. In 1993 the losses already 
declined substantially, although still remaining very high (Table 3). 
Table 3. 
















Lending to the 
public 
Total assets 
The results of the Finnish deposit banks 
(groups consolidated), billions of FIM 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
7.5  8.1  9.8  13.2  14.0  16.5  15.2  11.9  13.7 
5.1  5.8  7.2  9.3  10.4  10.0  10.3  12.5  11.6 
12.6  13.9  17.0  22.5  24.4  26.5  25.5  24.4  25.3 
8.1  9.3  10.7  14.1  16.5  17.9  18.7  19.3  19.4 



















-0.8  -16.9  -13.1 
4.0  4.8  2.6 
-4.8  -21.7  -15.7 
213.7  247.5  293.3  382.2  447.3  491.3  492.0  461.3  420.1 
364.4  432.3  508.9  645.3  742.3  791.3  801.6  784.5  754.2 
11  An analysis of the structure of non-performing assets and credit losses is  provided by Pensala 
and  Solttila  (1993).  Some  comparisons  of the  bookkeeping  practices  applied  in  a  number  of 
countries  are  also  given  in  the  paper.  Peisa  and  Solttila  (1992)  analyze  the  backgrounds  of a 
sample of firms  with payment difficulties. 
23 1.6.3  Nordic countries: some parallels 
A  Nordic  comparison  reveals  that  the  onset  of the  Finnish banking  problems 
closely resemble that of Sweden. In both countries, the problems started to emerge 
on a major scale in 1991 and peaked in 1992. In Norway, the process commenced 
earlier and banks' credit losses gradually crept up between 1987 and  1991, when 
there  was  a  steep  increase  in  losses.  That remains  the  peak,  as  losses  finally 
started to decline in 1992. In Denmark, losses have been  smaller, although they 
have increased over the past years, and Denmark cannot be counted as a banking 
crisis country in the same way as the 'Other three Nordic countries (Chart 14). 
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In  Norway,  Sweden  and  Finland,  the  backgrounds  of the  crises  are  similar. 
Financial markets  were  liberalized fairly  rapidly,  but economic  or supervisory 
policies  were  not  tightened.  Lending  criteria  were  eased  as  banks  and  other 
fmancial institutions competed for market shares in lending and sought to expand 
into new business areas. A favourable economic climate then led to rapid credit 
expansion, culminating in a general overheating of the economy. 
In the case of Norway and Finland a single factor was important in halting 
and reversing this  trend.  In Norway, the  shock was  provided by  the  fall in oil 
prices  while  in Finland it stemmed largely from  the collapse of trade  with· the 
Soviet  Union.  In  Sweden,  the  more  gradual  effects  of accumulating  debt  and 
slowing of growth in export markets appear to  have dominated, although eg the 
tax reform had a strongly depressive impact on the housing market.
12 
12 KoskenkyIa (1992) and Koskenkyla and Pensala (1992) describe and discuss the evolution ofthe 
banking crises in the three Nordic countries. Inter alia, Lindblom (1993), Koskenkyla (1993) and 
Vartiainen (1993) discuss more specifically the Finnish case. 
24 2  The Safety Net Prior to the Crisis 
2.1  General approach 
As in most western countries, bank instability was not considered a serious risk in 
Finland in the post-war decades. Fluctuations in aggregate economic activity were, 
given the active role of stabilization policy, generally thought to be too small to 
lead to massive losses of output and general deflation. Furthermore, the regula-
tions introduced in the  1930s and  1940s - interest rate regulations  and capital 
controls - helped to make banking a very stable business with highly predictable 
interest margins. Consequently, the public safety net and supervision arrangements 
were geared to tackling rather limited problems. 
The  systemic  safeguards  consisted  of  the  risk  and  capital  regulations 
incorporated in the banking legislation, security funds, supervision and the duty of 
the central bank to act as a lender of last resort. 
Finnish banking legislation has  not differed essentially  from that of other 
countries where there is universal banking. In particular, capital requirements have 
generally been as stringent as elsewhere. Thus, when the current capital adequacy 
regulations, based on risk-weighted assets and broadly in line with EC standards, 
were introduced at the beginning of 1991, most banks easily met the 8 per cent 
minimum standard. The most significant shortfall as regards the legal requirements 
probably  relates  to  the  regulation  of large  exposures,  which  has  allowed  for 
substantially larger risks than, for instance, present EC rules. 
Although the  current legislation has  been in  force  for  only just over two 
years, amendments have already been passed by Parliament. The new legislation, 
which will come into force simultaneously with the agreement on the European 
Economic Area, fully  harmonizes Finnish legislation with the EC directives. In 
terms of capital adequacy and risk regulations, the new legislation implies some 
tightening of the capital requirements for the local banks and a significant tigh-
tening of the regulations on large exposures. 
2.2  Security funds 
A compulsory security fund system (deposit insurance) was introduced in 1969. 
However, voluntary security funds had existed prior to that.  The savings banks 
and the cooperative banks had had their own security funds since 1924 and 1932, 
respectively. A fund for commercial banks was established in  1966.  Although 
based on law and supervised by the authorities, the funds are administered by the 
member banks. 
The  banks'  security  funds  are  responsible  for  repaying  the claims  of de-
positors if payment cannot be effected out of a  bank's own  funds  because of 
bankruptcy. The responsibility is unlimited (no ceiling per depositor). In addition 
to compensating depositors, the funds may grant subsidies and loans to member 
banks. 
Until 1992, only the resources of the security funds of the cooperative and the 
savings banks were utilized, and only for the purpose of support loans and grants 
to  support individual banks or bank mergers.  The system thus  functioned  as  a 
25 vehicle whereby banks could collectively handle the problems of individual local 
banks.  In this  it  was  aided by  a system of mutual  credit insurance  within  the 
savings and cooperative bank sectors, respectively. 
The resources accumulated were small in all security funds. In particular, the 
funds accumulated in the commercial banks' security fund were minimal in relati-
on to potential compensation liabilities. Until now, the banks' contributions have 
been flat-rate ie independent of the estimated riskiness of banks' portfolios. 
2.3  Lender of last resort 
The  central  bank  has  traditionally  had  wide  responsibilities  in  Finland.  The 
Regulations for  the Bank of Finland stipulate that  "the function of the Bank of 
Finland is  to  maintain  a  stable  and  secure  monetary  system  and  to  assist  and 
facilitate the circulation of money in Finland". This clearly implies that the Bank 
of Finland  has  a  role  as  lender  of last  resort  as  well  as  a  responsibility  for 
upholding systemic stability in the financial markets. 
In taking  control of Skopbank, the  Bank of Finland acted  as  the  ultimate 
provider ofliquidity. But in the Skopbank case the Bank of Finland also assumed 
responsibility for the solvency of the bank in the interest of systemic  stability. 
Given  the  lack  of alternative  responsible  authorities  capable  of handling  the 
situation at  the  time,  the  intervention  was  clearly  necessary.  Nevertheless,  the 
intervention did not, of course, fall wholly within the realm of traditional central 
bank operations. 
2.4  Bank supervision 
In Finland, prudential supervision of the banks was in the hands of the Banking 
Supervision Office until  October  1993  when bank supervision was  reorganised 
(see section 3.8 below). The office was subordinated to the Ministry of Finance 
but was, to  a large extent, self-financed through the supervision contributions of 
the  banks.  In  the  supervision  of the  large  number  of savings  and  cooperative 
banks, the Banking Supervision Office was assisted by semi-official supervision 
bodies of the savings banks and cooperative banks, respectively. 
In recent years, the responsibilities of the Banking Supervision Office were 
substantially enlarged by new legislation, covering inter alia the securities markets. 
With the exception of insurance companies, basically all financial institutions were 
supervised by the Banking Supervision Office. Insurance companies were and are 
the responsibility of the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health. 
The Bank of Finland also has some supervisory functions.  In part, they are 
based on the Foreign Exchange Act, which assigns to the Bank of Finland the role 
of supervisor of the currency risks of financial institutions. In addition, the Bank 
of Finland has, of course, a supervisory interest of its own because of its role as 
a lender to  the banks. 
In line with the aforementioned perception of the nature of risks in banking, 
the  Banking Supervision Office focused very  much on  the legal  aspects  of the 
supervisory functions.  Relatively little work was  carried out on quantitative risk 
analysis or in-depth risk appraisal of individual institutions. Thus, when the banks 
26 increased their risk positions in the newly liberalized markets, no clear warning or 
restraining action was forthcoming from the main supervisory authority. Similarly, 
the Bank of Finland failed to  perceive at an early stage the full consequences of 
the credit boom. 
27 3  Strengthening the Safety Net 
The take-over of Skopbank by the Bank of Finland was, by necessity, an ad hoc 
measure. Subsequent to this rescue operation, the Government decided to approach 
the looming bank problems on a more systematic basis. 
In  January  1992,  a  special  working  group  was  appointed  by  the .  Prime 
Minister to  review  the banking situation.  In its  report published in March,  the 
group suggested that two major steps be taken.13  The first was designed to avoid 
a  domestic  credit  crunch  and  consisted  of a  general  capital  injection  into  the 
banking system. The second was to speed up the establishment of the Government 
Guarantee Fund,  which had already been under preparation for some time.  The 
Fund was given responsibility for designing and implementing support measures 
for banks with acute problems. 
In August 1992, the Government announced that the stability of the Finnish 
banking system would be secured under all circumstances. This first, exceptionally 
strong and comprehensive declaration expressed the basic principle of the Finnish 
banking safety net:  no systemic problem would be allowed to materialize. Later 
this commitment was elaborated by Parliament (see section 3.7). 
3.1  General capital injection 
In March  1992,  the  Government  decided  to  provide  the  banks  with  a  capital 
injection totalling FIM 8 billion in order to support the supply of bank credit to 
customers.  At the same time, the capital infusion would,  of course, help banks 
avoid emergency support. It was offered to all banks regardless of their solvency 
and in relation to  their risk-weighted assets. Banks could apply for the injection 
only twice, the last time being in December 1992. By that time virtually all banks 
had availed themselves of the facility,  receiving, in  all, FIM 7.9 billion in fresh 
capital. 
The instrument used for the capital injection was a preferred capital certifica-
te,  which  was  designed  for  inclusion  in  banks'  primary  (Tier  1)  capital.  In 
particular, the investment carries a non-cumulative return, and the capital value of 
the  investment  can  be  written  down  to  cover  losses.  The  certificates  can, 
furthermore, be converted into voting stock if 
interest remains unpaid for three years in succession or 
the bank's solvency ratio falls below the legally required minimum. 
The certificates can be used to cover losses after the bank's distributable equity 
capital and the reserve fund have been exhausted. 
The interest rate  on the instrument was  set slightly above  the market rate. 
Furthermore, the rate gradually increases in relation to  the  market rate  so  as  to 
create an incentive for the banks to repay. 
13  The report was published by the Prime Minister's Office (1992). 
28 3.2  The Government Guarantee Fund 
The Government Guarantee Fund ("Fund" or "GGF") was established by law on 
30 April 1992 to  help ensure the stability of the banking system and secure the 
claims of both domestic and foreign depositors. The Fund was authorized to use 
up to FIM 20 billion for these purposes. The administrative costs of the Fund are 
covered by contributions from the banks. 
Support  can  be  provided  both  directly  to  individual  banks  or  indirectly, 
through  the  security  funds  administered  by  the  different  banking  groups 
themselves. In practice, direct support has been the norm. Various techniques can 
be used as  deemed necessary, including aquisition of bank shares, provision of 
other types of equity capital, loans, guarantees or other types of support. The Fund 
cannot, however, acquire all types of real or financial assets, thus being restricted 
from, for example, owning real estate or shares other than bank shares. 
Of course, the establishment of the Fund affected the responsibilities of other 
public  authorities.  In  particular,  it  was  no  longer  necessary  for  the  Bank  of 
Finland to  guarantee the  solvency  of a  troubled bank,  as  had happened in the 
Skopbank case. The Bank of Finland was subsequently able to concentrate on the 
provision of liquidity to the banks. In addition to its normal lending, the Bank of 
Finland has occasionally extended short-term bridging loans to the Fund. 
3.2.1  Organization 
According to the original organizational structure, in force until mid-March 1993, 
decisions on support measures were taken by a section of the board, comprising 
the representatives of the Banking Supervision Office, the Ministry of  Finance and 
the Bank of Finland. The Section was thus the executive body of the Fund. Banks 
were represented by three members on the board proper, where decisions on such 
matters as bank contributions and funding proposals were made. The supervisory 
board (with the same composition as  the Parliamentary supervisory board of the 
Bank  of Finland)  supervised  the  board  and  its  section  and  made  necessary 
proposals to the Government. 
In its  work,  the Fund has  made  extensive use of the  staff of the Bank of 
Finland and the Banking Supervision Office. However, the Fund remains a distinct 
legal entity, with no formal affiliation to any of the afore mentioned authorities. 
As will be described later (section 3.6), the organization of the Fund was changed 
in March 1993. 
3.2.2  Objectives and guidelines 
The Fund's supervisory board drafted general guidelines governing board activities 
in October 1992. They are used primarily when interpreting and implementing the 
legal obligations placed on the board and should not therefore necessarily be seen 
as exhaustive. 
According to the guidelines, systemic stability requires that confidence in the 
banking system is maintained among domestic as  well as foreign depositors and 
29 investors.  One important element of this is  that banks conducting international 
business  fulfill  international  capital  adequacy  requirements.  Another,  though 
separate, element is that bank deposits are safeguarded even though a bank may 
be unable to meet such obligations out of its own funds or even with the help of 
the security fund to which it belongs. 
Any support programme for a bank should meet a number of general require-
ments. Their exact interpretation was left to the body making the support decisions 
(ie the section in the original organization) as they will be part of any particular 
programme. The requirements are, in full, as follows: 
1.  Support is transparent and public. 
2.  The  attractiveness  and  public  funding  needs  of the  programme  shall  be 
minimized. The economic responsibility of the owners of the bank receiving 
support should be realized as  widely as possible. 
3.  The  terms  of the  programme  shall  support the  efficiency of the  banking 
system and contribute to necessary structural adjustments. 
4.  The distorting effects of the support programme on competition shall be mini-
mized. 
5.  Distortive interest rate competition is not allowed. 
6.  Public monitoring of the activities of bank receiving support shall be ensured. 
In particular, the granting of credit or writing  off credit on unusual terms 
should be avoided. 
7.  The  employment  terms  of the  bank's  directors  shall  be  reasonable  and 
possible inequities shall be removed. 
The exact terms of the support are, nevertheless, decided separately in each case. 
Accordingly,  a lively  discussion  has,  at  times,  been going on as  to  how  these 
guidelines  should be applied in individual  situations.  Particularly the  extent to 
which  the  responsibility  of owners  should  be  realized  and  the  usefulness  of 
mergers as  a means of rationalizing the banking sector have very much been at 
the centre of public debate. Nevertheless, the principles as such seem to have been 
generally accepted.14 
3.3  Problem bigger than expected in 1992 
The amount of funds the Government Guarantee Fund had to use to support the 
savings bank group in 1992 exceeded the projections made in the spring of 1992 
by a substantial margin so that all but FIM 5 billion of the funds authorized had 
14  The principles of bank support are discussed eg by Nyberg (1992b,  1993) and Aranko (1993). 
A banker's view  is  provided eg  by  Vainio (1993).  Vihriiilii  (1993)  discusses  bank support and 
safety net issues more broadly. 
30 been used or earmarked by the end of the year.  Moreover, developments in the 
economy were  worse than  anticipated  as  deflationary forces  were  stronger and 
growth  in  export  markets  weaker  than  expected.  It was  therefore  considered 
prudent to increase the resources at the Fund's disposal. 
Also, the administration of bank support proved inadequate. According to its 
original charter, the Government Guarantee Fund had no full-time staff of its own. 
Staff was assigned from the Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision Office 
to the extent needed. Furthermore, a very substantial amount of analytical work 
was done by staff not permanently assigned to Fund duties.  As  the number and 
complexity of bank problems increased it became apparent that the Fund needed 
a stronger organization. Full-time staff would be necessary, even though staff from 
the Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision Office continued to  assist the 
Fund. 
The original organization proved problematic in two  other respects as  well. 
First, representatives of the Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision Office 
could not simultaneously act as  owners of the troubled banks and perform their 
supervisory duties without a conflict of interest. Furthermore, the sheer scale of 
the  support  operations  implied  that  the  funds  should be controlled by  a body 
politically accountable to Parliament, ie by the Government. 
3.4  Comprehensive reform proposal 
To rectify these shortcomings, the Government introduced a bill in Parliament in 
January  1993  providing for  a comprehensive reform of the existing Act on the 
Government Guarantee Fund.  The bill contained three main elements.  First, the 
authorization of the Fund to grant support was to be raised from FIM 20 billion 
to FIM 50 billion. Second, the Fund was to be subordinated to  the Government 
instead of Parliament and given permanent staff. Finally, the Fund was to set up 
and own shares in asset management companies ("bad banks"), into which prob-
lem assets of banks in distress could be hived off. 
Although there was a broad consensus in Parliament on the need to increase 
resources earmarked for bank support and the administrative reform also received 
wide  support,  the  bill  failed  to  obtain  the  required  5/6  majority.IS  In fact,  the 
main parliamentary groups agreed on the contents of the banking package after the 
idea of asset management companies had been dropped. However, the opposition 
refused to support the immediate enactment of the proposed amendment, as  the 
Government was unwilling to commit itself to expansionary fiscal policies being 
demanded by the opposition. 
15 According to the Finnish constitution, the transfer of budgetary authority away from Parliament 
must be passed in  the same manner as  an  amendment to  the constitution. Immediate ('urgent') 
enactment of a constitutional amendment, in turn, requires a qualified majority of 5/6 of all votes. 
31 3.5  More resources in a supplementary budget 
After the rejection of the comprehensive bank support package, the Government 
asked  Parliament  to  authorize  an  increase  of FIM  20  billion  in  the  amount 
available for bank support through a supplementary budget, which can be passed 
by a simple majority. Of the total, FIM 5 billion was earmarked for guarantees. 
The  amount  was  limited  to  FIM 20 billion  because  under  supplementary 
budget procedure  no  more  funds  can be  appropriated  than  can reasonably  be 
expected to be used during the fiscal year. The actual need for funds in 1993 may, 
in fact,  fall short of FIM 20 billion, as the authorization makes allowance for a 
number of worst-case  assumptions  about bank performance and  the  timing of 
support actions. 
One important aspect of the new bill was that future support measures were 
to be decided upon by the Government, not by the Fund. In the budget bill, the 
Government nevertheless committed itself to apply the guidelines adopted by the 
Fund's Supervisory Board in October 1992. The bill was passed on 2 February, 
1993. 
3.6  Administrative reform 
In February  1993,  the  Government proposed an  amendment to the Act on the 
Government Guarantee Fund that provided for a reform of the administration of 
bank support much along the lines of the more comprehensive reform bill rejected 
in January. The amendment was approved on 23 February. Under the amendment, 
the  number of board members  were  reduced to  five,  only  one  of whom is  a 
representative of a  specified  organization,  the  Ministry  of Finance.  The Fund 
reports to the Government, which makes all the support decisions on basis of a 
formal Fund board proposal. 
The Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision Office are not formally 
represented on the board. The links to the latter bodies remain, however, through 
permanent advisers to the board from both organizations. In addition, the Bank of 
Finland and the Banking Supervision Office continue to assist the Fund (Chart 
15). 
As  before, the board is  appointed by the Parliamentary supervisory board, 
which  also  retains  its  other  supervisory  functions.  A  manager  and  assistant 
manager head a staff of some 20 persons. The new board was appointed in mid-
March 1993  and has remained unchanged since.  Recently, the Government has 
indicated that the supervisory board may be redundant and should be abolished, 
but no  formal  decision  on  this  has  yet  been  taken.  In  fact,  the  present 
organizational setup may help ensure transparency and, indirectly, continued broad 
support for the measures necessary for stabilizing the banking system. 
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3.7  Parliament reaffirms commitment to banks 
When passing the amendment to the Act on the Government Guarantee Fund, Par-
liament unanimously approved a resolution endorsing and reaffirming the commit-
ment of the Finnish authorities to safeguarding the stability of the banking system. 
The resolution reads as follows: 
"Parliament requires the state to guarantee that Finnish banks are able to meet 
their commitments on time under all circumstances. Whenever necessary, Parlia-
ment shall grant sufficient appropriations and powers to be used by the Govern-
ment for meeting such commitments". 
The  resolution  is  more  explicit  than  the  Government's  declaration  of 6 
August  1992.  It  stresses  that  the  entire  political  system  stands  behind  the 
commitments  made  by  the  Finnish  banks.  It further  asserts  that,  even  though 
Parliament wishes to exercise control over the  use  of public funds  through the 
normal budgetary procedure, it undertakes to grant all funds that might be needed 
to  guarantee that banks can fulfil  their commitments. The resolution is  without 
parallel  in  Finnish  parliamentary  history,  and  remains  in  force  for  the  time 
being. 16 
16  Bank  support  policy  of the  Government  is  spelled  out  most  recently  in  the  Government's 
communication to Parliament on  bank support (December 1993). 
33 3.8  Reorganization of banK supervision 
The failure of  the supervisory authorities to detect early enough the emerging crisis 
speeded up  plans  to  strengthen bank supervision.  The reform  took effect on 1 
October 1993. 
The basic idea of the reorganization was to increase supervisory efficiency by 
concentrating  the  supervision  of banks,  other  credit  institutions  and  securities 
markets in the hands of a new body  called  the Financial Supervision Authority 
(FSA), organized as an autonomous unit in conjunction with the Bank of Finland. 
The responsibilities of the new authority are essentially the same as  those of the 
earlier Banking Supervision Office, with the exception that FSA carries out, for the 
. Bank·of Finland, certain supervisory tasks relating to the Foreign Exchange Act. 
However,  the  resources  of  the  Financial  Supervision  Authority  have  been 
substantially strengthened. Most of the  personnel of the supervision arm  of the 
Bank of  Finland was transferred to FSA, and all basic facilities ie. data processing, 
library,  personnel  management  etc.  are  shared  by  the  central  bank  and  the 
supervisory body. The closer organizational ties between the supervisory body and 
the central  bank should  also help  pooling the  essential  information  on macro-
prudential issues. 
In terms of decision making, the Financial Supervision authority is no part of 
the central bank. The Authority has its own Board consisting of the director of the 
FSA, and representatives of the Bank of Finland; the Ministry of Finance and  in 
some cases the Ministry for Social Mfairs and  Health.  Most of the operational 
decisions are taken by the director alone. The decisions of the FSA can appealed 
to a court like any other administrative decisions. 
34 4  Support Programmes Implemented 
After the Skopbank operation by the Bank of Finland and the pre-emptive general 
capital  injection,  bank  support  has  been  administered  by  the  Government 
Guarantee Fund. The Fund has supported the banking system in four cases. First, 
Skopbank was  acquired  from  the  Bank of Finland in  June  1992  for  FIM  1.5 
billion.  Secondly,  also  in June  1992,  it was  decided to  support the 41  savings 
banks who were later to merge to form the Savings Bank of Finland (SBF). This 
was  done with  an  original commitment of FIM 7.2  billion,  of which FIM  5.5 
billion  in  Tier  1 capital.  During  1993  the  SBF  was  further  recapitalized  and 
eventually sold  to  its  main competitors.  Thirdly,  in November  1992,  the  Fund 
supported the  merger agreed on between STS-Bank and KOP  by  conditionally 
agreeing  to  take  over  a  large  part  of  the  former's  bad  assets.  Fourth,  the 
Government in principle agreed to provide Kansallis-Osake-Pankki, Union Bank 
of Finland and the security fund of the cooperative banks with guarantees to be 
used in connection with their recapitalization. 
4.1  Skopbank 
The  acquisition  of Skopbank by  the  Fund  from  the  Bank of Finland  did  not 
involve any  major change in the restructuring programme already under way at 
that  bank.  However,  the  holding  companies  managing  part  of the  industrial 
holdings  and  real  estate  assets  of Skopbank remained in  the  ownership of the 
Bank of Finland.  The  aquisition was  purely  technical,  reflecting  the new  dist-
ribution of responsibilities after the setting up of the Government Guarantee Fund. 
In addition  to  the  original  aquisition  cost  of FIM  1.5  billion,  the  Fund 
provided a further  injection of capital  of FIM  1 billion  in  December  1992.  A 
further FIM 1.8 billion was used or committed in 1993. 
4.2  Savings Bank of Finland (SBF) Rationalization Effort 
A number of savings banks, many of them located in the main urban areas  and 
with substantial amounts of problem assets, showed signs of increasing distress 
during  the  first  half of 1992.  Since the  savings bank system was  built on  the 
principle of mutual financial responsibility for each other's solvency, the situation 
created potential problems for  a number of other savings banks as  well.  Addi-
tionally,  one  of the  major  assets  of a  number  of savings  banks  was  stock  in 
Skopbank, the value of which after the Bank of Finland rescue was a matter of 
administrative convenience. 
It was concluded that the problem could be managed only through a massive 
merger affecting both problem and nonproblem banks. This was expected to ease 
the administration of the support and restructuring program as  well as utilize the 
capital  resources  of the  savings  banks  sector  for  the  rescue.  To  resolve  the 
situation  without  overextending  the  resources  of the  Fund,  the  Government 
Guarantee Fund (GGF) decided, in June 1992, to support the ailing savings banks 
on condition that 41  of them merged to form the Savings Bank of Finland and 
35 accepted a stringent restructuring program. Those forty  savings banks which did 
not  take  part  in  the  merger  continued  their  activities  mainly  in  the  form  of 
traditional savings banks. 
The  Fund  initially  provided  the  emerging  SBF  with  a  capital  injection 
(including preferred capital certificates) of FIM 5.5 billion in June, together with 
a  guarantee  of FIM  1.7  billion  for  the  issue  of a  subordinated  loan.  The 
subordinated loan was eventually taken up by the Fund itself up to an amount of 
FIM 1.4 billion while the rest of the facility (FIM 0.3 billion) was converted into 
additional capital support. 
As  the  economic  situation  of the  SBF  proved  to  be  worse  than  initially 
estimated, further capital support became necessary. A major reason for this was 
that the bank's auditors demanded that planned write-downs of real estate holdings 
had to be speeded up. In December, a further capital injection of FIM 4.7 billion 
was therefore provided, of which almost FIM  1.2 was  in the form of share ac-
quisitions. The total amount spent by the Fund on supporting the SBF had thus 
reached almost FIM 12.5 billion by the end of 1992. Until October 1993, the SBF 
received a further FIM 2.1  billion, bringing the total amount of support for  the 
bank to a total of 14.5 billion. 
The ultimate  goal  of the  SBF restructuring programme  was  that the  bank 
should become  profitable  again  by  the  end  of 1996  through  eg  reductions  in 
operating  costs  and  its  branch  network.  The  programme  also  included  other 
requirements dictated by the general guidelines: 
a  Owners of the merging savings banks  (primarily savings bank foundations) 
lost virtually all their capital on the banks' balance sheets. The employment 
terms of directors were trimmed and were to reflect the extent to which the 
support programme is fulfilled,  thus creating incentives for compliance and 
efficiency. 
b  The bank undertook to  convert itself into a joint stock company as  soon as 
legally possible, the majority of voting stock (or convertible preferred capital 
certificates) to be held by the Government Guarantee Fund.  After that, the 
Fund would be free to dispose of the stock in a manner which bes serves the 
general interest. The conversion took place in December 1992. 
c  Apart from the capital infusions, the Fund did not provide the SBF with any 
funding  at  special rates.  The Bank of Finland did,  of course, extended the 
same  rights  to  the  bank  as  to  other  major  banks  in  Finland  as  regards 
fulfIlling the criteria relating to eg solvency. 
d  The  Fund  appointed  one  member  of the  board  as  well  as  one  of SBF's 
auditors. As owner, the Fund also had the right to appoint a sufficient number 
of members  to  the supervisory  board of the  bank.  The  bank was  also,  of 
course, obliged to report regularly and when so requested on its activities and 
on its economic and financial situation. 
In its restructuring program, accepted by the GGF, SBF undertook to put more 
stress  on  retail  banking  as  opposed  to  investment and  commercial banking,  to 
reduce  costs  markedly  and  to  achieve  a  more  balanced,  longer-term  funding 
structure. Risks were to be reduced by shortening the balance sheet. 
36 Cost reductions were to  be achieved by vigorously reducing the number of 
both branches and staff. Accordingly, staff was reduced by about 1500 persons in 
1992 and a further almost 600 persons until October, 1993. The bank thus reduced 
its  personnel by more than  a  quarter in less than two  years. During the  same 
period  160 branches were closed,  reducing the branch  network by almost one 
fifth. Actual costs savings, of  course, lagged behind these numbers because of lay-
off costs, and started to have an effect on financial results only during 1993. 
Lending  and  risks  were  reduced primarily by  drawing  down credits  deno-
minated in foreign currencies, by reducing off-balance sheet items and by drawing 
down credits to high-risk sectors. By the fall of 1993 the balance sheet was thus 
reduced to some FIM 86 billion from almost FIM 96 billion by the end of 1992. 
Further cuts to a final balance sheet of FIM 65 billion by the end of 1996 were 
foreseen. 
While cost and risk reductions remained well on track, performance as regards 
credit losses and funding was worse than foreseen. 
Non-performing loans amounted to FIM 13.5 billion, net, at the end of 1992, 
after the write-offs of almost FIM 8 billion. During the first nine months of 1993, 
non-performing loans increased by FIM 3.5 billion which was substantially more 
than originally expected. However, credit losses were unlikely to increase in the 
same proportion. The increase in non-performing loans was primarily due to the 
recession being both deeper and longer than originally foreseen, particularly in the 
sectors where the bank for historical reasons found itself heavily involved. This 
represented a development over which the SBF had little control, but the effects 
on profits was, of course, negative. 
Even  before  the  creation  of the  SBF,  the  constituent  banks  were  losing 
deposits  at  a steady though modest rate for  several  reasons.  First, the  savings 
banks were seen as less solid than other banks and this may have reduced their 
attractiveness in the eyes of depositors. Secondly, this situation was later actively 
exploited by the SBF's major competitors. Thirdly, the GGF required the SBF to 
stop paying the above-average deposit rates that had been agreed to with certain 
depositors by the savings banks involved in the merger. Since market interest rates 
gradually fell below the high fixed rate paid on part of these deposits inherited by 
the SBF, this made good commercial sense also for the bank itself. 
The reduction in deposits was almost matched by a fall in SBF assets, which 
meant that the bank did not encounter acute funding difficulties. In all, deposits 
fell by more than FIM 3Y2  billion or some 7 per cent in the period between the 
end of 1992 and the end of September 1993.  Though these developments were 
largely  undramatic,  the  bank's  weakened  capability  to  attract  deposits  raised 
questions about SBF's viability in the long run. 
Thus the restructuring of SBF proceeded largely as originally planned, though 
credit  losses  were  larger  than  expected  and  some  problems  appeared  on  the 
funding  side.  However,  both SBF itself and the authorities responsible for  the 
handling  of  the  bank  were  meeting  increasingly  vehement  critisism.  This 
originated both  in  other domestic  banks,  in political  fora  and in  the  press. It 
seemed unfair that  a  bank should be allowed to  compete  in the  market while 
37 recelvmg  so  much  public  support17.  It was  also  felt  that  something  decisive 
should be done  to rapidly reduce  excess capacity in the sector, thus  supporting 
profitability in the sector as  a whole. Finally, there was a growing public demand 
for doing  something to  end what was  seen as  a the main focus  on the  Finnish 
banking crisis. 
4.3  Sale of the SBF 
On  22  October  1993, the  Finnish Government,  on  the  recommendation of the 
GGF,  decided  to  sell  the  sound  parts  of the  Savings  Bank  of Finland  (SBF) 
balance sheet in equal parts to four of the bank's competitors for a total price of 
FIM 5.6  billionl8.  This  reflected  the  GGF's view  that  other options  were  less 
advantageous and that restructuring the bank under the GGF's ownership would 
not prove feasible. 
The  SBF  was  split  up  according  to  branches.  The  buyers  agreed  among 
themselves  on  which  bank  would  receive  a  particular  SBF  branch,  with  the 
constraint that the splitting-up should avoid as far as possible the creation of local 
monopoliesl9.  Each  branch  is  to  be  transferred  with  its  balance  sheet  and 
customers, by May 1994. Of course, the customer is free to choose the bank with 
which bank he or she wants to do business. 
The total value of the  SBF assets to be transferred is  about FIM 41  billion, 
which will be financed by deposits to a value of some FIM 49 billion. The buyers 
agreed among themselves on a temporary restraint on competition in force  until 
1 April  1994, in order to  avoid disruptions in the practical arrangements for the 
transfer.  Deposit  and  loan  conditions  of current  SBF  customers  will  not  be 
affected by the transfer. 
The non-performing assets of SBF are transferred to an asset-holding company 
(Arsenal Ltd.)  financed at  the government's risk.  The assets include loans, real 
estate and  other assets totalling FIM 30 billion and guarantees totalling FIM 9 
billion. Further transfers of assets which turn non-performing or which perform 
badly  may  be made in  1994.  It is  estimated that  these  additional  items  could 
amount to  some  FIM 4 billion,  implying a total  risk of some  FIM 43  billion. 
Losses may eventually reach FIM 15  billion. Arsenal Ltd may extend additional 
credit  to  its  customers  in  cases  where  this  reduces  the  total  cost  to  the 
government. 
The remaining part of the balance sheet will, for the time being, be kept on 
the books of SBF, which will be wound down within a relatively short time. The 
balance sheet of this entity will primarily consist of miscellaneous securities (of 
17  By summer,  1993, the banks that merged into SBF or that bank itself had received a total of 
almost FIM 15 billion in capital infusions or other financial support. This was more than one third 
of the total sum of capital injections and loans used for the banking sector as  a whole. 
18 If the cost of closing SBF turns  out to be small enough,  a conditional outpayment from  the 
bank's remaining value may raise the value recovered by the GGF to some FIM 7 billion. 
19 Naturally, this can only be regulated in the initial stage of the transaction. Over time, banks will 
be free to trade branches among themselves if this makes commercial sense. 
38 which  FIM  10  billion  remain from the  previous  SBF)  including  financing  of 
Arsenal Ltd. and participations, all financed primarily by bank credits, notes and 
bonds. The SBF will cease to function as a bank within a relatively short time. 
The role of Skopbank, in which  th~ GGF maintains its majority shareholding,' 
will  not  change  in  any  way.  It will  continue  its  activities  as  before,  though 
obviously the volume of its business will decline. It will also continue to function 
as the central banking institution for the remaining savings banks and to continue 
to serve its  non-bank customers.  It will  also retain  all  the rights  (to  eg central 
bank financing) of a major Finnish commercial bank. 
The  sale  of the  SBF implies  a very  significant  change in  banking market 
shares in Finland. The savings bank group becomes much smaller and ceases to 
operate in large parts of the country.  The cooperative bank group becomes  the 
largest provider of  banking services for households, while small and medium-sized 
businesses rely more equally on each of the four largest bank groups (Chart 16). 
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In September 1992, STS-Bank asked the Government Guarantee Fund for support 
since its assets posed a considerable risk to the solvency of the bank. STS-Bank 
was  a relatively small commercial bank whose status had recently been changed 
from that of a savings bank. Like many savings banks it was encountering serious 
39 profitability problems related to credit losses and reductions in the value of real 
estate holdings. 
As the owners of STS-Bank were unable to provide additioI).al capital and the 
bank  functioned  in  areas  where  excess  banking  capacity  existed,  it· appeared 
unviable as an independent entity. The Fund therefore encouraged negotiations on 
a  merger  between  STS-Bank  and  Kansallis-Osake-Pankki  (KOP) ,  a  major 
commercial bank. In November, STS-Bank announced that it was going to merge 
with KOP. In the same context, KOP bought the majority of STS-Bank shares at 
a price close to the going market rate, but substantially below their nominal value. 
The merger was negotiated in very close cooperation with the Government 
Guarantee Fund and under its  auspices. The Fund assumed responsibility for a 
substantial part of the  problem assets  of STS-Bank,  subject to  subsequent par-
liamentary approval.  The bank's bad assets  were  to  be transferred for  eventual 
disposal to a separate asset management company ("bad bank"), in which the Fund 
was to  have a large majority holding while KOP  was  to provide administrative 
expertise. 
In the event (see below), Parliament did not approve the creation of such a 
company, which meant that the provisional agreement could not be finalized as 
planned. The exact conditions of the merger therefore had to be renegotiated, the 
situation being complicated by the fact that the amount of problem assets of the 
STS-Bank turned  out to  be  substantially larger than  originally foreseen by the 
Fund. 
On 8 April 1993, the Government Guarantee Fund agreed on an arrangement 
for managing STS-Bank's problem loans, which totalled approximately FIM 3.4 
billion and contained potential losses of some FIM 2.5 billion. These loans are to 
remain on the books of STS-Bank while other assets will be transferred to KOP. 
The Fund is  responsible for  90 per cent and  KOP  for  10 per cent of the loan 
losses and STS-Bank management costs. Because of the unexpected increase in 
losses,  KOP  will,  inter alia, pay FIM 75  million to  the Fund.  Finally, the joint 
security  fund  of the  commercial  banks  and  Postipankki  Oy  transferred  all  its 
assets,  totalling  approximately  FIM 342 million,  to  the Government  Guarantee 
Fund. 
The former STS-Bank (renamed Siltapankki) will continue to  function as  a 
commercial bank but will, in its operations focus exclusively on the management 
of the stock of problem loans (in essence, becoming a "bad bank"). KOP retains 
ownership of STS-Bank but the effective control of the bank has been transferred 
to the Government Guarantee Fund under a separate agreement. 
4.5  Guarantees provisionally provided to other banks 
During 1993, the Government decided, in principle, to support KOP, UBF and the 
co-operative  banks  with  guarantees  to  be  used  when  raising  risk  capital  on 
international  markets.  For  this  purpose  a  guarantee  for  FIM  1.8  billion  was 
provided for KOP, FIM 1 billion for UBF and FIM 0.9 billion for the co-operative 
banks for a total of FIM 3.7 billion. 
.  The  guarantees  are  to  cover interest  and  principal  on  issues  of preferred 
capital certificates and subordinated debentures in the cases of KOP and UBF. In 
the case of the co-operative banks, the guarantee covers interest payments, for a 
40 limited time only, on debt instruments used for support of banks provided by the 
group's security fund (see section 2.2) to banks within the group. 
So far,  no  bank has  utilized the guarantee facility.  The  use  of the facility 
will  probably  be  determined  by both market  developments  abroad  and  by the 
timing and size of the banks capital needs. 
4.6  Resources used 
In all, the GGF had paid out 16.8 billion for various types of bank support by the 
end  of 1993.  The  Government,  in  turn,  had  paid  out  FIM  10.7  billion  and 
provided guarantees for  a very  provisionally estimated total of FIM 42 billion. 
The Bank of Finland had paid out more than FIM 11  billion in conjunction with 
the Skopbank operation (not counting interest foregone), including guarantees of 
FIM 0.5 billion to its  asset recovery companies.  Therefore, the total amount on 
general and selective bank support paid out until the end of 1993 was FIM 38.5 
billion,  supplemented by  gurantees  for  a total  of FIM 42.5 billion  (of which  a 
large  part were  either not  used or represents  rough estimates).  The  total  gross 
funds committed to banks support were therefore FIM 81 billion or almost 18 per 
cent of nominal GDP. 
The main part of the funds committed were earmarked for the savings banks 
sector including Arsenal Ltd., Skopbank accounting for FIM  11.6 billion (some 
14.5 per cent of the total) and SBF (including Arsenal) for FIM 52.0 billion (some 
60  per cent  of the  total).  Other  banks  received  funds  or  commitments  either 
through the general capital injection in  1992 or through guarantees which so far 
mainly have not been utilized. 
Apart  from  incurred  and  potential  capital  losses,  the  investments  imply 
significant opportunity costs; for the Bank of Finland alone the estimated interest 
earnings foregone amounted to some FIM 2.5 billion by the end of 1993. 
Most of the paid-out support has  been in the  form of investments counted 
towards  Tier 1  capital  (preferred  capital  certificates,  shares).  Decisions  on 
providing guarantees were made for large sums during 1993 but not used. While 
only a small fraction of the Fund's support is in the form of ordinary loans, the 
Bank of Finland has significant amounts of loans outstanding on its books. 
41 Table 4.  Bank support in Finland from 1991 to 1993, FIM million 
Bank of  Council of state  Government Guarantee Fund  Total 
Finland State's  Preferred  Share  Guarantee/  Loan  Sub- Preferred  Share  Transfer4 
capital  capital  capital surety  ordinated  capital  capital 
investment certificates  loan  certificates 
1991  Skopbank  43301  4330 
1992 Skopbank  94442  580  1 500  1000  12524 
Savings Bank of Finland  1 094  1 400  7100  2900  12494 
Other savings banks  160  160 
Security fund of the savings banks  500  500 
Okobank  422  422 
Cooperative banks  1 108  1 108 
Postipankki  903  903 
Union bank of FinlandlUnitas  1 749  1 749 
Kansallis-Osake-Pankki  1 726  1 726 
STS-Bank  170  170 
1993  Skopbank  -27223  350  1 200  -1  172 
STS-BanklSiltapankki  -170  3036  2866 
Savings Bank of Finland  750  250  950  150  2100 
Sale of Savings Bank of Finland  -1  094  -750  -3756  -5600 
Asset management company Arsenal Ltd  3442  1 558  5000 
Security fund of the savings banks  -345  -345 
Transfer4 to  the Government Guarantee Fund  -357  -357 
Support disbursed as  at 31  December 1993  11  052  6648  350  3692  155  1400  10 030  5608  -357  38578 
1992 Guarantees, of which to asset management  600  600 
companies Table 4. 
Bank of Council of state  Government Guarantee Fund 
Finland State's  Preferred  Share  Guarantee/  Loan  Sub- Preferred  Share  Transfer4 
capital  capital  capital  surety  ordinated capital  capital 
investment certificates  loan  celtificates 
1993  Guarantees/sureties, of which to  asset  -100 
management companies 
Kansallis-Osake-Pankki  I 8005 
Union Bank of FinlandlUnitas  1 0005 
Security fund of the cooperative banks  9006 
Asset management company Arsenal Ltd  380007 
Skopbank  300 
Funds committed to bank support  11  552  6648  350  3692  42000  155  1400  10 030  5608 
1993  State's other bank risks 
KansaJlis-Osake-Pankki  1 001 
Union Bank of FinlandlUnitas  445 
Cooperative banks  700 
Total  11  552  6648  350  5 138  42000  155  1400  10 730  5608 
Comprises share capital of FIM 2 000 million, a composition of FIM  1 900 million, including a claim of FIM  1 500 million on Oy Tampella Ab waived by  Skopbank, asset 
management companies' equity capital totalling FIM 400 million and other items totalling FIM 30 million. 
2  Comprises the transfer of Skopbank's real estate and shareholdings to asset management companies in the total amount of FIM 9 752 million and a loan of FIM 1 500 million 
to  Skopbank; from these amounts have been deducted repayments totalling FIM  1 808 million, including the purchase price of FIM  1 500 million received from the sale of 
Skopbank's shares and preferred capital certificates. 
3  Repayments, comprising repayments of loans raised by  asset management companies and repayment of capital. 
4  Transferred by  the security fund of commercial banks and Postipankki Ltd to  the Government Guarantee Fund. 
5  Decision in principle. 
6  Decision in  principle on a guarantee for the repayment of interest. 
7  Preliminary estimate of the State's guarantee commitments at the end of 1994. 
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5.1  Macroeconomic situation 
5.1.1  Exports grow but domestic sectors still weak 
Banks' prospects for 1994 and 1995 depend crucially on the general macroecomic 
environment.  As  in  1993,  the  current macroeconomic  situation continues to be 
characterized by highly disparate developments. Activity in many key domestic 
sectors  still  remains  depressed,  though  the  outlook  has  improved.  Consumer 
sentiment has turned positive as have business expectations. In fact, retail trade in 
durables, as well as transportation and energy production appear to be picking up. 
However, construction continues to decline though apparently bottoming Out.  On 
the other hand,  manufacturing output increased rapidly,  the growth rate having 
been some  10 per cent during  1993, led by the strong increase of exports since 
mid-1991. Although export growth appears to start tapering off, total output now 
appears to have started increasing by mid-1993. On average, however, total output 
in 1993 is likely to have declined by some 2.5 per cent from 1992. 
5.1.2  Interest rates down, share prices up 
Interest rates  have  declined considerably following  the  floating  of the  markka. 
Initially, this was  due to reduced turbulence on the European currency markets, 
but domestic  developments  helped,  too.  On  14  October  1992,  the  Government 
announced a new fiscal package designed, inter alia, to reduce borrowing needs. 
Furthermore,  the  Bank  of Finland  has  cut  its  the  base  rate  in  all  by  3.25 
percentage points since the beginning of 1993. Consequently, Finnish short-term 
market rates had fallen to around 5 per cent by early  1994 from over 9 per cent 
a year earlier. 
Bond  yields  have  also  come  down  substantially;  the  yield  on  5-year 
government bonds had declined to around 6 per cent by early 1994 from over 10 
per cent a year earlier.  This suggests that markets do not expect there to be an 
acceleration of inflation though the fact that long interest rates were high relative 
to  those abroad indicates some  uncertainty.  As  noted  above,  the exchange rate 
strengthened at the same time. 
Basic  inflation  (from  which  changes  in  public  fees  and  taxes  have  been 
eliminated) is expected to remain around 2 per cent annually in the coming years. 
This implies present real annual interest rates of 3-4 per cent. 
The  stock market has  risen  very  rapidly  throughout  the  last year (in  fact, 
since September, 1992). By early 1994, share prices had more than doubled from 
their value a year before, and the general index is almost at its high, reached in 
1989. Foreign interest in acquiring Finnish shares seems to have increased, as  a 
20 The outlook for the economy as a whole as well as for the banking sector in particular reflects 
the situation in early April 1994, and may rapidly become outdated, as new information becomes 
available. 
44 result  of the  rising  value  of the  markka  and  strong  competitiveness  in  the 
industrial sector. 
5.1.3  Growth picks up, external balance improves fast 
Growth in Finland's main export markets is expected to gradually strengthen in 
the near future. This supports the expansion of exports which has been caused by 
the vast improvement in the price competitiveness brought about by the depre-
ciation  of the  markka,  stagnant  labour  costs  and  rapid  productivity  growth. 
Furthermore, new  export markets  have rapidly opened up  especially in the Far 
East. However,  at some point, maybe quite soon, capacity constraints as  well as 
market saturation at the  going price is  likely to  retard export growth.  Domestic 
demand is likely to still remain  very weak in  1994,  partly because the savings 
ratio remains high, partly because investments remain sluggish. Because of this, 
total output is  projected to  pick up  only slowly, possibly accelerating markedly 
during 1995. 
Inflation will remain  slow because of excess capacity,  notwithstanding the 
contribution of higher import prices following the depreciation of the markka after 
it was  allowed  to  float.  There  are  signs  of some  cost pressures  in  the  export 
sector, and surveys indicate modestly strengthening inflationary expectations. 
With domestic demand stagnant, the external balance is improving rapidly. In 
1992, the trade surplus more than doubled to FIM 12.5 billion and again to FIM 
30.8 billion in  1993. The current account deficit, which was still FIM 22 billion 
in 1992, diminished to FIM 5.5 billion in 1993. In the course of 1994 the current 
account is expected to turn into a surplus. 
5.2  Near-term prospects for the banking sector 
With slow  or negative  overall  growth in the  economy,  stagnating or declining 
domestic demand and the heavier debt  -service burden of the domestic-sector firms 
with foreign  currency  loans,  the  fall  in  interest rates  during  1993  was  not yet 
sufficient to  help  banks to  attain profitability.  Problem loans  and credit losses 
remained  substantial.  That  continued  to  squeeze  net  interest  earnings.  Total 
balance sheets continued to contract in response to the reduction in bank lending. 
However, the fall  in interest rates  as  well  as the  gradual bottoming out of total 
demand and production reduced bank losses by over a quarter, and the growth of 
non-performing loans decelerated markedly, even falling in net terms21  (Table 5). 
In  1994,  the  banks'  situation  should  continue  to  improve.  A  substantial 
fraction of  bad loans should have been written off by then, and net interest income 
should  have  started  to  recover  as  a  result  of lower  money  market  rates  and 
(probably)  higher  margins.  The  rationalization measures  under  way  will  make 
themselves felt in lower operating costs during 1994. In addition, the substantial 
21  The impact of Arsenal Ltd holdings of problem loans on the total is, however, difficult to assess 
precisely. 
45 Table 5.  The results of individual banks in 1993 (1992), Million of FIM 
Income and Expenditure by  Major Categories  1993  Profit before extraordinary items, 
appropriations and taxes 
Income from  Other  Expenses  Credit and  Depreciation  1993  1992 
financial  Income  guarantee 
operations  losses 
Unitas  2 166  2515  2884  3772  601  -2576  -2702 
KansalIis-Osake-Pankki  2273  2615  3264  3814  471  -2661  -3659 
Postipankki  2738  1 294  2233  1 939  213  -353  -640 
Skopbank  491  237  649  1 683  97  -1  701  -3596 
Okobank  853  872  976  450  178  121  84 
Alandsbank  103  55  72  48  6  32  27 
Interbank  78  17  49  27  8  11  21 
Savings banks except SBF  625  298  636  106  -104  -138 
Cooperati ve  banks  3677  1 927  4651  227  -2049  34 
Sub-total  13  004  9830  15414  11  733  1 907  -9280  -10 569 
STS-banklSiItapankki  -64  202  489  1 441  78  -1  870  -474 
Savings Bank of Finland (SBF)  771  1 509  3332  2839  631  -4546  -10 740 
Grand total  13  711  11  541  19235  16013  2616  -15 696  -21  783 transfer of sound assets accompanying the increase in deposits associated with the 
sale of SBF should start to raise bank profits markedly. 
However,  the  degree  of  improvement  will  depend  very  much  on  the 
macroenomic climate in the near term. The recovery is expected to continue 
during 1994, but thus far signs of rising domestic demand are provisional only. A 
faster-than-expected recovery in the main export markets could significantly boost 
overall  activity in Finland,  and thereby  enhance  the  debt  -servicing capacity of 
banks' customers. On the other hand, investment activity could be held back by 
a prolonged slow  down abroad or lack of finance due to ia. reduced risk tolerance 
by banks.  This  would not only postpone the recovery but also  further  weaken 
banks' profitability.  22 
Although the weak demand for credit has probably so far prevented a "credit 
crunch"  from  constraining investment to  any  marked extent,  credit availability 
may become a significant impediment in the case of smaller weakly capitalized 
firms  - in  part due  to  lack  of collateral - if the  demand for  credit starts  to 
increase rapidly. The freer provision of financial services across borders brought 
about by the EEA agreement and the development of the domestic capital markets 
should, nevertheless, help solid borrowers to find alternatives to borrowing from 
domestic banks. 
22  The nature of the potential financing problems is discussed eg by VihriiiUi (1992). Solttila and 
VihrHilii (1992) provide some evidence of the link between bank capital and credit supply. Brunila 
(1992) analyzes the debt problems in various production sectors. 
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